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Towards a Science of Climate and Energy Choices  
1. Introduction 
 There is consensus in the scientific community and much of the policy community that human 
activities are bringing about deeply troubling changes in Earth’s ecosystems and in the biosphere itself.  
Some argue that the planet has entered a new geological era, the Anthropocene.1  Anthropogenic climate 
change is arguably the most fundamental of anthropogenic environmental changes, in that human 
activities anywhere on Earth can affect planetary systems that produce physical, chemical, biological, and 
social consequences at all geographic scales, anywhere on the planet, and stretching over centuries.   
Anthropogenic climate change is driven by many kinds of human activities, but the ones that have had the 
greatest effect over the past century involve the combustion of fossil fuels and the resulting atmospheric 
emissions, primarily of CO2. 2 3 4  Thus, energy use must be a critical focus of any effort to understand 
and control climate change, and it is a central focus of this collection of papers. 
Anthropogenic stress on the environment derives from the scale of human activities, the 
composition of what we consume, and the technologies and forms of social organization we deploy in 
production and consumption.5 6 These relationships are often encapsulated in the IPAT identity, which 
analyzes anthropogenic environmental impact (I) as the product of the size of the human population (P), 
the scale of human activity (A, typically measured as level of economic activity per capita) and a factor, 
commonly called “technology” (T), but including, by the nature of an identity, anything—hardware, 
behavioral practices, forms of knowledge—that affects the degree of environmental impact per unit of 
economic activity7.  The identity implies that controlling increased human stress on the environment 
could be accomplished through change in any of these driving forces. The Kaya identity, which is 
frequently used in discussions of climate change, is simply the IPAT identity with the T term divided into 
energy consumption per unit GDP and carbon emissions per unit of energy consumed.8   
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Social science—broadly defined as the study of society and the way people behave9-- has long 
been engaged in the study of P, A, and T in relation to various types of environmental impacts and has 
produced a rich and diverse literature.5 10  The dynamics of population and of affluence are the central 
themes of major fields within the social sciences. Our focus here is on energy use and consequent impacts 
on global climate.  The most common research approach in this area has been to move from the IPAT 
identity to statistical models that estimate the elasticity of these drivers of impact—the amount of change 
in environmental stress per unit change in the driver.  Other analyses examine the plasticity of the 
drivers—the amount that P, A, and T change as a function of other social or economic conditions, 
including deliberate interventions.11 12   
Efforts to reduce human stress on the environment have to take account of both elasticity and 
plasticity by trying to identify strategies that are feasible to implement and that will have substantial 
impact.  At the same time, broader social and technological changes can shift plasticity, making things 
that were once hard to change more malleable.  For example, subsidies for renewable energy can reduce 
the obstacle of up-front investment costs, making it easier for individuals and organizations to adopt these 
technologies.  Many recent analyses suggest that the elasticity of human population size with regard to 
environmental stressors, including greenhouse gas emissions, is about 1-1.5, a moderate but not 
inconsequential value.7  13 At least since the 1960s the advantages of slower population growth have been 
understood, as have the factors that influence fertility, in particular women’s empowerment, improved 
health care and access to effective contraception.14 15 16 17 18 Affluence tends to have a higher elasticity 
than population,7 19 but since nearly every government promotes economic growth, it is not an attractive 
target for change, unless perhaps indicators of affluence are modified so as to separate measures of 
overall economic activity from indicators of human well-being in order to focus on ways to increase the 
return on well-being of economic activity. 20 21 22   
Of course, neither the elasticity nor the plasticity of drivers of environmental stress is constant 
over time or across local and national contexts.  Countries vary greatly in their ratios of CO2 emissions to 
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GDP, and many policies, for example, to promote energy efficiency and renewable energy development, 
are specifically intended to change this ratio.23  Moreover, countries differ in their levels of integration 
into global production networks and supply chains and into the global governance system of treaties and 
protocols.  Thus countries are differentially engaged in the global environmental governance that comes 
both from public policy and from private sector environmental standards. 24 25 26 Some countries influence 
other countries by deploying their values and economic power.  In some cases this leads to convergent 
trajectories of economic development and environmental impact but in other cases these processes lead to 
sharply divergent paths of development with differing trajectories of environmental impact, including 
offshoring of adverse environmental impacts to less powerful nations. 27 28 29  30 31 
Social forces—power, culture, institutional arrangements—shape the scale, content, techniques, 
and trajectories of production, distribution, and use of goods and services and the associated uses of 
energy.  Thus an adequate analysis of the Anthropocene cannot proceed without substantial engagement 
of the social sciences.  At the same time, the social sciences cannot make much progress working in 
isolation from the physical, ecological, health and engineering sciences.  To advance the dialogue across 
disciplines, this special section assesses the state of current knowledge that emerges primarily from the 
social sciences.  Each paper constitutes a synthesis and points the way forward around some key 
problems.  Taken together they provide a broad overview of the state of social science research on energy 
and climate change. 
Most of the papers in this special section are focused on climate and energy choices, and 
therefore on the social, cultural and political forces that shape the dynamics of energy production and 
use—the largest driver of climate change.  That is, they focus on aspects of the T term in the IPAT 
identity other than technology per se.  Of course, technological change per se has great promise for 
addressing climate change.  In an influential paper, Pacala and Socolow argued that increased adoption of 
existing technology could produce “wedges” of CO2 emissions reduction—so called because they 
represent contributions to reduced emissions that increase over time—that could potentially meet global 
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energy needs for 50 years without doubling the preindustrial CO2 concentration.32  But a decade of 
experience since then suggests that the plasticity of T has been less than hoped for, with the result that 
technological, policy, and social change to date have not kept pace with growing population and affluence 
and thus greenhouse gas emissions have continued to increase.  
Social science research is relevant to understanding why technological wedges have not 
materialized and how change in T—that is, in what we consume and how we produce what we consume, 
might be achieved.  However, not all social science energy or climate research is immediately useful for 
these purposes.  As Table 1 suggests, two questions can be asked of energy and climate research: Does it 
have immediate practical implications?  Does it contribute to fundamental knowledge?  Some research 
does neither, and can even be regressive in the sense that it draws selectively on results in order to 
advance a certain policy agenda. Ideally, research programs, including those described in the papers in 
this collection, try to emphasize the upper right corner of Table 1--what has been called “Pasteur’s 
Quadrant.”33   The papers in this collection tend toward Pasteur’s quadrant, though they also include 
material from adjacent quadrants  
Table 1: A Typology of Social Science Energy and Climate Research   
  
 
 Immediate usefulness 
 
 No Yes 
Fundamental 
understanding 
Yes Pure basic research (e.g., history of energy 
use during the Renaissance)  
Use-inspired basic research (e.g., 
studies of determinants of 
adoption of energy efficient 
technologies) 
No Research that makes no contribution to 
knowledge; sponsored research or advocacy 
drawing inappropriately or selectively on 
science (e.g., campaigns to discredit climate 
change science) 
Purely applied research (e.g., 
analysis to support more effective 
advertising campaigns for 
household renewable electricity 
systems) 
  
Note: The shaded part of the matrix is sometimes referred to as Pasteur’s Quadrant. 
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The papers in this collection contribute to understanding by “unpacking” T, and in particular by 
examining the great variety of non-technological factors affecting the connections between economic 
activity and emissions. These issues require an integrated scientific approach that engages the social 
sciences along with the natural sciences and engineering: 34 35 36 37 38 39  what has been called a science of 
coupled human and natural systems40 or a second environmental science,41 and is embodied in the concept 
of sustainability science.42  This approach seeks to understand the human activities that alter 
environmental systems and the processes that drive them as well as processes that might reduce the 
environmental impacts of human activity while improving human well-being. 
2. Social Science Insights on Climate and Energy 
The papers in this collection reflect the emergence of empirically based, data-driven science 
about climate and energy choices, drawing on diverse concepts spanning numerous social science fields.. 
They provide greater nuance and realism than analyses that rely too much on attractive but empirically 
doubtful simplifying assumptions about energy choices.  Among these assumptions are that technologies 
that can alleviate the climate impact of human activities will be adopted when they pass a threshold of 
economic return to investment, that energy consumers’ choices can be adequately modeled solely as a 
function of maximizing utility, and that decision makers have accurate information about the 
consequences of their choices and the ability to process that information unerringly.  Energy analyses also 
often assume that governmental regulations will be implemented and followed fully once enacted, and 
that it is only through governmental action in the form of regulations and financial incentives that fossil 
fuel consumption can be controlled.  Wise analysts recognize these assumptions as stylized and as 
overlooking important realities about human interactions with energy and environmental systems.  
Nevertheless, policy makers often treat results embodying these assumptions as adequate to guide their 
decisions.  The papers in this collection elaborate more realistic assumptions and the promising policy 
directions they suggest. 43 44    
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Insights about human action that emerge from empirical and theoretical analysis and demonstrate 
the value of the social sciences in addressing climate and energy issues have a long history.  They build 
on a long tradition of social science research on energy that goes back at least to the 19th century, when 
grand theorists invoked energy as a key variable in understanding social structure and social change. 45  
The streams of research that lead to this collection of papers, however, are largely traceable to the 1970s, 
when the “energy crises” that were articulated around the OPEC oil embargos stimulated new lines of 
analysis.  Mazur and Rosa were among the first to note that energy consumption per capita and quality of 
life become “decoupled” after a modest level of consumption is reached and thus opened space for 
analyses of energy efficiency as a social phenomenon.46 This line of analysis has linked to recent calls for 
a focus on well-being rather than economic growth as a metric of societal progress in analyses that assess 
the amount of damage done to the environment as a function of the amount of human well-being a society 
generates—the environmental intensity of well-being.47 48 49  Interdisciplinary research groups also soon 
began investigating the drivers of household energy use, 50 51 52 53, initiating lines of research that continue 
today.  By the 1990s, this work was closely linked with research on climate change mitigation, even as 
separate lines of scholarship examined vulnerability and adaptation to climate change.54 55 
Although the papers in this special section might be categorized in various ways, we think it 
useful to imagine climate and energy choices in a space defined by three themes (risk and technology, 
nested hierarchies, and policy architecture) and three dimensions (the scale at which actions take place, 
the actors in various roles, and the processes occurring at multiple temporal scales).  The papers in this 
collection occupy various parts of this space, and in doing so touch upon other relevant themes ranging 
from discourse and framing to governance and ideas about behavior and identity. 
Theme 1: Risk and emergent technology  
Climate change makes evident major risks associated with current energy systems.  Social science 
research helps understand and explain differing perceptions of these risks and differing support for 
policies to reduce them, both within and between national populations.56 57  It can also help understand 
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different interpretations and judgments about the feasibility, viability or desirability of particular 
technologies.58  Such judgments can also involve different interpretations of “systemic risk” - hazards that 
are complex, uncertain, ambiguous, and which have the potential to reverberate throughout political, 
social, and economic dimensions.59 60 For instance, as Table 2 shows61, many energy systems alleviate 
some risks (or achieve social or economic advantages) only by presenting other risks (including social or 
economic costs).  Oil has many uses but is prone to spills and generates greenhouse gas emissions; 
nuclear power is low-carbon but can have catastrophic accidents and presents a very challenging waste 
storage problem; renewable sources of electricity that emit no greenhouse gases can present other 
problems.  In short, no energy system is free of potential adverse impacts.  
Table 2: Eight Energy System Risk Profiles  
Technology  Availability Affordability Resilience Sustainability Security 
Oil Pros Historically 
in plentiful 
supply; 
readily 
transported 
Historically 
inexpensive 
Many uses (i.e. 
electricity, 
transport) 
Established 
supply 
networks 
Source of revenue for 
exporters  
 Cons Majority of 
supply in 
unstable 
nations; risk 
of rapid 
depletion 
Future costs  
could present 
economic 
hardship 
Supply 
controlled by 
unstable 
regimes; 
supply routes 
risk prone 
Source of 
greenhouse 
gas emissions; 
depletable; 
risk of 
damaging 
spills. 
Source of dependence 
and insecurity for 
importers 
Natural Gas Pros Historically 
in plentiful 
supply; 
readily 
transported 
Historically 
cheap source of 
peak load fuel 
Many uses (i.e. 
electricity, 
heating, 
cooking) 
Established 
supply 
networks 
Source of revenue for 
exporters  
 Cons  Significant 
supply in 
unstable 
nations; rapid 
depletion 
Potentially 
expensive after 
low-cost reserves 
are depleted  
Some supplies 
controlled by 
unstable 
regimes; 
supply routes 
risk prone 
Source of 
greenhouse 
gas emissions; 
depletable 
Source of dependence 
and insecurity for 
importers 
Coal Pros Historically 
plentiful; 
linked to 
transport 
infrastructure; 
supplier 
diversity 
Historically 
cheapest source 
of base-load fuel 
Many uses (i.e. 
electricity, steel 
making); easily 
stored 
Historically 
stable source 
of 
employment 
Source of revenue for 
exporters 
 Cons Rapid Mercury, CO2 Supply route Key threat to Source of insecurity for 
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depletion  and other 
emissions 
produce severe 
hidden costs. 
congestion climate 
change; 
source of 
major health 
problems 
importers  
Hydroelectric 
Dams 
Pros Key domestic 
resource;  
Relatively 
predictable 
supply 
Cheapest 
historical source 
of renewable 
energy 
Largely subject 
to domestic 
control; 
flexible 
renewable 
source 
Clean source 
of energy 
Easy to manage once 
established 
 Cons Supply 
expansion has 
limits 
Environmental 
damages and 
decommissioning 
can represent 
hidden costs 
Undermined by 
drought, 
technical 
failures, and 
terrorist attacks 
Engenders 
environmental 
degradation 
and can entail 
the forced 
relocation of 
communities 
Can become targets 
during periods of social 
or military conflict 
Solar and 
Wind 
Electricity 
Pros Key domestic 
resource that 
any nation 
can exploit  
Many 
technologies are 
now 
commercially 
viable 
Different 
technologies 
suit different 
needs; easy to 
scale up; 
decentralized 
Clean source 
of energy; 
highest ratio 
of jobs per 
kWh 
Decentralized generation 
improves system safety; 
Can minimize impact of 
fossil fuel price increases 
 Cons Supply can 
be 
intermittent 
and 
unpredictable 
Intermittency 
poses hidden 
costs 
Can be 
undermined by 
environmental 
or climatic 
changes  
Requires 
integration 
with other 
systems 
Can be expensive and a 
source of voter dissent, 
dependent on rare earth 
minerals imports 
Nuclear 
Power 
Pros Can help 
diversify 
energy 
portfolio  
Low historic 
operating costs 
after facilities 
have been paid 
off and/or 
subsidized  
Large, 
centralized 
plants are easy 
to secure 
Viewed as a 
low-carbon 
pathway to 
cheap energy 
in the future 
Nuclear technology spin 
offs can provide scientific 
benefits; nuclear power is 
a status symbol 
 Cons Requires high 
level of 
technical 
expertise 
Prone to cost 
overruns and 
long lead times    
Can undermine 
electric grid 
when 
malfunctioning, 
can also be 
prone to 
terrorist attacks  
Presents 
major waste 
and safety 
challenges, 
health risks 
Presents major waste 
management and safety 
challenges; Has troubling 
links with weapons 
proliferation; may require 
authoritarian or 
interventionist 
government regimes  
Biofuels Pros Most nations 
have some 
supply  
Potentially good 
use of waste 
Can be 
produced by a 
variety of 
sources 
Meshes well 
with agrarian 
communities 
Can enhance agricultural 
development strategies, 
minimize oil imports 
 Cons Not enough 
to fully 
replace other 
fuels 
Food versus fuel 
controversy 
Requires 
continued 
expansion of 
land-use to 
expand supply; 
hard to ramp 
up. 
Can require 
inputs such as 
pesticides and 
fertilizers 
Not an advanced use of 
land; gives rise to 
deforestation and 
resulting human and 
environmental insecurity  
Energy Pros Opportunities Cheapest way to Significantly Gives rise to Inexpensive to implement 
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Efficiency  available 
everywhere  
reduce carbon 
footprint 
reduces impact 
of conventional 
fuel price 
increases 
innovation 
and 
competitive 
advantage 
 Cons Knowledge 
needed to 
exploit 
Can in some 
cases cause a 
rebound or 
takeback effect  
Solutions 
exhibit a 
progressively 
increasing cost 
profile 
Displaces jobs 
in traditional 
energy 
industries  
May encourages battles 
over standard setting) 
 
Several contributions in this section address issues of risk perception and decision-making, or 
analyze risks of emergent energy technologies that could minimize the environmental degradation 
associated with conventional energy sources or even radically reorient energy markets.  Wong-Parodi et 
al.62 focus on the decision-making process around emerging energy technologies and how different actors 
conceptualize risk connected to them. Others, in the tradition of past studies relating to risks associated 
with particular energy technologies, focus on technologies such as nuclear reactors and waste 
management 63 and commercial-scale sources of renewable electricity.64   
Theme 2: Nested hierarchies   
Social science analysis can be difficult because social units are not neatly embedded in one 
another:  individuals play multiple roles, have multiple affiliations with formal and informal organizations 
and are embedded in multiple social networks.  When units are neatly nested in one another, for example, 
individuals within households within regional political units such as states or provinces within nations, 
well-developed methods exist for understanding contextual effects, such as how national culture and 
institutions influence individual decision making.65  When the nesting is more complex, such as with 
individuals holding simultaneous affiliations with local communities, organizations where they work, and 
social movements, network analysis methods are required and the complexity of untangling multiple 
sources of norms, incentives and constraints increases greatly.66 67  Indeed, units larger than the individual 
can be thought of as decision makers (a household decides to adopt solar photovoltaics, a corporation 
decides to build a wind farm, a national government decides to sign a treaty), as responders to network 
influences (an individual interacts with other household members, fellow workers, neighbors, and 
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members of other informal social groups; corporations interact with suppliers, clients, competitors and 
governments), and as contexts within which individuals make decisions (a household in a neighborhood 
decides to by an electric car, a company within an industry decides to reduce its carbon footprint, an 
individual in a government agency decides to advocate for policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions). 
Analyses might ideally take account of all these non-nested hierarchies and networks at once, but 
different streams of scholarship have focused on particular decision making units and roles, and on 
particular temporal scales of change.  The most attention has probably been focused on individuals and 
households and on their short-to mid-term changes in energy consumption 23, support for public policy 68 
64, and participation in environmental decision making69, undoubtedly because the research challenges are 
more tractable there.  Still, network ties, embeddedness in larger structures, and influences across social 
levels are important determinants of choices.70  Stern et al. 23 discuss network effects on energy efficiency 
choices by organizations.  For example, in advocating for  more ethically informed decision making, 
Sovacool et al.63 propose involving multiple actors including consumers, jurists, and energy users in 
addition to investors and policymakers.  
The efforts of social movement groups to influence policies and corporate actions that in turn 
affect the choice sets available to energy consumers provide another example of multiple interacting 
levels of action.71  For instance, the emerging “divestment” movement seeks to influence public entities 
such as universities and religious organizations to eliminate fossil-fuel companies from their investment 
portfolios.  The arguments for divestment range from the moral to the economic (e.g., that these 
companies are bad investments because future policies will cause their energy assets to be “stranded” in 
the ground and unavailable for economic return).  The divestment movement seeks to send a message to 
fossil fuel companies that as a matter of corporate strategy and public image, they would be wise to 
diversify their offerings.  Companies that offer their customers ways to meet their energy needs with 
lower CO2 emissions make it easier for “green” consumers to lower their carbon footprints.  Such new 
linkages between consumers, firms, and communities of firms appear to be proliferating in environmental 
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governance. 72 73 Of course, fossil fuel companies that seek to avoid stranding their assets often actively 
resist policies to reduce emissions, leading to a contested political terrain.  
There are parallel issues for workers.  For example, the expansion of residential solar 
photovoltaics may create more jobs than will be lost in the coal industry, but those new jobs will not be in 
the communities losing the old jobs.  Similarly, the adoption of electric vehicles and nuclear power plants 
in Europe and North America might help make those societies more sustainable.  However, they can 
impose social and environmental costs related to the mining of rare earth minerals and uranium in Africa 
and Asia and on the lands of native peoples in North America.74  Such conflicts and tradeoffs can at times 
undercut and even contravene the stated goals of energy and climate policies. 
Theme 3: Policy and regulatory architecture  
A third theme of these papers is that social science research can inform the design, monitoring, 
and evaluation of governance mechanisms.  Non-regulatory government interventions to promote energy 
technologies generally fall into three broad classifications: supply-push mechanisms, often involving 
direct subsidies to producers; demand-pull mechanisms aimed at creating demand for them; and hybrid 
mechanisms which fall into both categories.  Common examples of specific supply-push strategies 
include: (a) conducting basic and applied research and development on energy technologies; (b) building 
large test or prototype facilities; (c) government procurement of large amounts of an experimental 
technology; and (d) investor tax credits that spur innovation on a given technology.  Common examples 
of demand-pull strategies include: (a) tax credits for the production or adoption of certain energy-using 
technologies; (b) rate-based incentives for favored technologies; and (c) promoting technologies through 
training or information and awareness campaigns.75 76 77 
The papers in this volume expand upon such typologies and offer visions beyond the traditional 
regulatory and price-based mechanisms and beyond the notion that governance can be achieved only by 
the actions of governments.78 A substantial literature demonstrates that consumers do not strictly adhere 
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to the narrow rational actor model in making energy decisions—a diverse set of other factors, including 
values beyond self-interest, inaccurate perceptions of the carbon footprints of consumer goods, and 
differential trust all play a role.23  Non-economic motives for change in energy systems can be critically 
important influences on policy, as when energy policies are responsive to notions of justice and fairness.63   
Influences beyond those typical in policy analysis offer important opportunities for action.  For example, 
non-regulatory actions by government and private-sector entities to improve documentation of the carbon 
footprints of goods and services available in markets could enable consumers who want lower footprints 
to choose products that satisfy this desire.  This possibility connects actors at different social levels and 
can affect choices with fairly long-term implications.79 80  Marketing programs that acknowledge the 
importance of trust in consumer decision making could prove much more effective than those that do not 
take account of how people assess new information, themes explored below in dimensions cutting across 
scales of action, actor’s roles, and temporality. There is also research on ways that non-governmental 
actors sometimes perform important environmental governance functions independently of governments’ 
actions, for example, by making binding agreements to reduce environmental footprints and establishing 
non-governmental regulatory standards and institutions.81 82 
Dimension 1: Scales of Social Action   
Integrated energy analysis needs to examine the three themes of technological risk,  nested 
hierarchies, and policy architecture in relation to three  dimensions of energy systems: scale, actors, and 
rates of change.  Actions at levels of social organization from the individual and the household to 
communities and formal organizations, and on to national and international scales can all make 
meaningful contributions to mitigating climate change.  Some papers in this collection focus on energy 
choices at particular social scales:  household and organizational energy consumption,23 community-level 
processes,64 and international governance. 83  Other papers present and discuss analytical methods that can 
be applied at various levels to develop and validate empirical knowledge about energy choices and 
identify and test promising strategies for change. 63 84 62 85 
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Empirical investigation of energy choices at all social scales demonstrate the limitations of many   
simplifying assumptions often used in energy analysis.  As the papers in this collection show, approaches 
built on more realistic models of behavior have the potential to achieve change in emissions that go 
beyond what can be achieved with the most commonly debated policies.  Victor and Keohane’s analysis 
of past experience with international agreements provides an example,83 as well as Geels et al.’s call for 
integrated assessment modeling to be better blended with “practice-based action research.”85  For 
instance, treaties among nations that place demands on all signatories are unlikely to be both achievable 
and strongly implementable, and therefore, they argue, have less practical potential for reducing carbon 
emissions than the aggregate of less-ambitious treaties involving fewer nations.  Similarly, Stern et al. 
point out that financial incentives for household investments in energy-efficient technology have a tenfold 
variation in their uptake depending on implementation and point to a set of empirically derived principles 
for energy program design that can combine incentives with other program features to achieve greater 
plasticity in household energy decisions than incentives alone.23   
Dimension 2: Actors’ Roles  
The multiple roles of social actors in energy systems are perhaps most easily seen at the level of 
individuals, who function not only as consumers making choices that affect their direct energy 
consumption, but also as members of organizations (firms, schools, churches, etc.) where they influence 
those organizations’ energy choices.23  In addition, individuals are also citizens who may express their 
views on public policy choices affecting energy production and consumption and participate in social 
movement organizations that seek to influence the actions of governments or firms86 or social justice 
movements calling for broader change.63  
Private sector organizations also act in multiple roles, including as energy consumers, as 
producers of goods and services that shape energy use by their customers, and as actors in policy 
systems.23 87  Government agencies can also have multiple roles: they are energy consumers; they can be 
energy producers; they supply goods, services and information to individuals and organizations; they 
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conduct research on all aspects of energy; they are sources of regulations and other incentives and 
constraints on other actors in energy systems; and they participate in international assessment and 
decision fora.83 
Dimension 3: Pace of Transition  
Meaningful change can happen at various temporal scales.  Over the short term, daily choices 
about energy usage (e.g., choosing to use public transit versus a private car for a trip) can cumulate into 
important impacts.  The mid-term scale of equipment replacement, such as household choices about 
which appliance or automobile to purchase or organizational choices about replacing energy-consuming 
equipment or the design of new buildings have substantial consequences.  Long-term, roughly 
generational-scale choices and processes that affect what form new communities take, how transportation 
systems develop, what energy generation and transmission infrastructure is brought on line, and how 
social norms evolve have immense impact.  Some papers in this collection explicitly distinguish these 
temporal scales. Some focus on the potential for short- and mid-term changes in energy technology and 
its usage among households and organizations.23 63  Others look at relatively longer-term changes in 
infrastructure, policy, and norms, including the dynamics of social networks84 and shifting attitudes about 
local renewable energy developments64  Some consider the potential for change over even longer time 
frames of decades or even centuries, such as the challenges of managing long-term nuclear waste63 or of 
analyzing and informing large-scale low-carbon transitions 85 or global climate change agreements that 
often span generations.83  
The pace of widespread change in energy systems may be much slower than is often desired. Part 
of the reason is that renewable sources of energy have so far been slow to substitute for and displace 
fossil fuels: 88Major energy investments have not yet prioritized climate “stabilization wedges.”   The 
International Energy Agency has warned that if “action to reduce CO2 emissions is not taken before 2017, 
all the allowable CO2 emissions [to keep global warming below 2oC] would be locked-in by energy 
infrastructure existing at that time.”89  Yet, globally, far more resources are still being devoted to new 
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fossil fuel infrastructure development than to renewable energy and low-carbon infrastructure. As Figure 
1 shows, in 2013, investors directed about $250 billion to all forms of renewable energy but sunk $950 
billion into new coal, oil, and gas infrastructure. In the United States alone, oil and gas investment soared 
to $200 billion in 2013, amounting to 20 percent of total private fixed investment. This matched the 
volume of investment in home building, a “first” in the country’s history.90  Globally, investment in fossil 
fuel initiatives tripled in real terms from 2000 to 2013.91  The bottom panel of Figure 1 shows continuing 
increases in total greenhouse gas emissions over much of this period. Investment in both renewable and 
fossil energy is driven in substantial degree by costs and energy prices.  Technological improvements are 
likely to drive down the costs of renewables more than they will fossil fuels.  However, between 2013 and 
2015 (the latest point for which data are available) the annual mean price of a barrel of oil declined from 
above $100 to about $50, reducing the incentive to invest in alternatives 
Figure 1: Annual Global Investment Rates in Selected Energy Systems (billions of $USD) and 
Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions (billion tons of CO2e), 2007-2013 
a. Renewable energy investment rates 
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b. Fossil fuel investment rates 
 
c. Global greenhouse gas emissions 
 
Note: *Includes waste-to-energy, excludes off-grid fuelwood consumption. OG=Off grid. GC - Grid Connected. 
Source: Renewable energy investment figures come from Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century 
(REN21), Renewables 2011: Global Status Report (Paris: REN21 Secretariat, 2011); Renewable Energy Policy 
Network for the 21st Century (REN21), Renewables 2012: Global Status Report (Paris: REN21 Secretariat, 2012); 
Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21), Renewables Global Status Report 2013 (Paris: 
REN21 Secretariat, 2013); and Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21), Renewables 
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Global Status Report 2014 (Paris: REN21 Secretariat, May, 2014). Fossil fuel numbers come from Ambrose Evans-
Pritchard, Oil and gas investment in the US has soared to $200b, Daily Telegraph, July 10, 2014.  Global 
greenhouse gas emissions figures assume IPCC's A1FI with growth allocations to countries based on International 
Energy Outlook (2014) 
It is critical, though analytically difficult, to consider the relationships that drive change at longer 
time scales, in addition to the short- and mid-term processes that have been most frequently examined. 92   
An obvious example is the effect on future carbon emissions of the development paths taken by lower-
income countries.  A substantial literature shows that human well-being can increase without concomitant 
increases in energy consumption or environmental impact once a modest threshold of consumption is 
reached, and evokes important long-term questions.  How can these countries move to higher levels of  
wellbeing while keeping emission low??  Will new communities be constructed to be less dependent on 
motorized transport than older ones were?  Will they be designed for linkage to locally available 
renewable energy sources?  Where can the plasticity be found that would favor change from past practices 
in development? 
3. Conclusions and Policy Insights  
Social science and integrated research on climate and energy choices supports at least four high-
level conclusions.  Perhaps the most fundamental is the need to supplement analytical models based on 
simple assumptions (such as that of “rational” economic choice with complete information) with 
assumptions based on empirical analysis of the phenomena of concern.  Intellectually attractive but 
inaccurate simple assumptions are unlikely to yield the level of understanding needed to speed transitions 
to sustainable energy systems that meet reasonable targets for limiting climate change.  Thus, in designing 
policies and programs it is critical to realize that people and organizations do not use all available 
information and are strongly influenced by information that is readily available and comes from trusted 
sources.  A step towards more nuanced policy design in this respect can be found in the recent Executive 
Order by U.S. President Barack Obama “Using Behavioral Science Insights to Better Serve the American 
People.”93   In the consideration of energy systems, it is also important to recognize that judgments about 
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risk have both objective and subjective elements and that adopting any energy system normally implies 
trading off some elements of security or sustainability with each other. In making risk judgments, it is 
important for both energy consumers and energy researchers to become more informed and self-reflexive 
about their choices and underlying assumptions, so that they can better recognize their own biases, seek 
data-driven answers rather than those based on opinion or conjecture, and carefully differentiate 
assertions based on facts from those grounded in values.94  The simple presumption that risk can be 
analyzed from a single perspective fails to take into account that risk decisions intrinsically include 
judgmental elements and that affected people’s judgments vary.62 
Second, addressing the challenges of energy sustainability and climate change requires analyses 
of human actions and the potential for change organized around problems in the space identified above, 
rather than by disciplines.95  Disciplines can contribute, but their research efforts need to be guided 
primarily by problems rather than only by building and testing disciplinary theories.  Integrated, cross-
disciplinary research is needed; a useful byproduct is likely to be the creation of new interdisciplinary 
fields.27 28 38 96 
Third, available research makes clear that the effects of interventions are context-specific.  Many 
energy choices depend on very specific aspects of particular role situations: the most obvious examples 
are energy retrofits and PV installations in buildings: every building is unique in its structure, equipment, 
orientation to the sun, and shading.  Interventions such as regulations, prices, and other incentives may 
have non-obvious but important variations, as already noted.71  For this reason, many kinds of 
interventions need to be somewhat individualized.  Research can identify the key barriers that usually 
stand in the way of desired actions and guide a case by case diagnosis of the barriers that are especially 
important for specific choices.  Contextual specificity makes energy users highly heterogeneous, 97 the 
implication being that as in many other domains of human activity, empirical analysis of human 
interactions in energy and climate systems is unlikely to yield universal laws.,  Thus, in applying research 
findings, it is crucial to consider contexts and the multiple roles played by individuals, organizations, and 
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social institutions. The implications of research findings will likely vary across contexts and time scales.  
Thus, what may appear as a general finding might increase or decrease in importance when extended to 
other contexts.  Theories of context for climate and energy choices are at an early stage of development.  
Some contributions propose design principles for interventions that have fairly high generality but must 
be validated and refined empirically for particular choice contexts. 98 99 100 
 Fourth, if one accepts the need for more a rigorous, interdisciplinary, context-sensitive science of 
energy and climate choices, funding and research and development strategies need to change.  For 
example it has been estimated that in the United States research spending on topics related to energy 
efficiency and the behavior of users was 1/35th the research expenditures directed at hardware and 
building technology.101  This bias towards “technology” obfuscates that it is often broader social, political, 
economic, organizational, or cultural concerns that determine whether cleaner energy systems diffuse or 
energy and climate policies are effective.  Current energy and climate challenges inextricably link the 
social with the technical.  Many opportunities to examine those connections have been outlined 
elsewhere; 3 44 54 95 102 to pursue them, more attention and more funding must be allocated to social science 
analysis. 
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